Ring signature is a kind of digital signature which can protect the identity of the signer. Certificateless public key cryptography not only overcomes key escrow problem but also does not lose some advantages of identity-based cryptography. Certificateless ring signature integrates ring signature with certificateless public key cryptography. In this paper, we propose an efficient certificateless ring signature; it has only three bilinear pairing operations in the verify algorithm. The scheme is proved to be unforgeable in the random oracle model.
Introduction
In the traditional cryptography, the communicating parties distribute a private key by sending the key in advance over some secure channels. But there is a major barrier that the key distribution will cost and delay large teleprocessing networks. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [1] first introduced the concept of public key cryptography (PKC) and proposed some techniques to solve this longstanding problem in traditional cryptography. But the traditional public key infrastructure confronted with the problem of certificate management. In order to solve this problem, Shamir [2] proposed an identity-based cryptography scheme based on public key cryptography (ID-PKC) in 1995. In his scheme, every user chooses his fundamental information as his public key and the user's private key is generated directly by a private key generation (PKG) referred as master key. But there is a problem that the third party PKG has the private keys of all users and must be fully trusted; we call it the key escrow problem.
In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson [3] introduced the concept of certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC). CL-PKC not only overcomes key escrow problem but also does not lose some advantages of ID-PKC. Key generation cryptography (KGC) in CL-PKC only issues the partial private key to a user. Then, the user combines the private key from KGC with a self-generated secret key to generate his actual private key, so that the KGC does not access user's private key fully like in ID-PKC. Moreover, the public key of a user is generated by user himself by computing the KGC's public parameters and the secret values of the user. Over last years, the certificateless signature (CLS) has been investigated successfully and attracted great attention [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] .
In 2001, Rivest et al. [9] first proposed the concept of ring signature (RS). Ring signature is designed for the situation that a member in a group wants to sign messages on behalf of the group while keeping his identity anonymous. Therefore, ring signature can protect the identity of the signer. In a ring signature, the signer forms a group (called a ring) only by collecting the public keys of all the group members including himself to keep the singer's identity anonymous. In addition, ring signature is characterized with spontaneity; it means that the singer can generate a valid signature without help of any other members of the ring. Due to above two characteristics of ring signature, it is now widely used in electronic voting.
A ring signature should meet the following three properties:
(i) Verifiability. The verifier can be convinced of the signer's agreement on the signed message. (ii) Unforgeability. No one, even any member of the ring, can forge other ring members to generate a valid ring signature. After ring signature given by Rivest et al. [9] , many researchers have been proposing ring signature schemes and their variants such as threshold ring signatures [10] [11] [12] and constant-size ring signatures [13] [14] [15] [16] . Ring signature schemes based on standard assumptions without random oracles were proposed in [17] [18] [19] [20] .
As we know ring signature has been studied greatly in traditional PKC [18, 21, 22] and ID-PKC [17, [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] . But the applications of ring signature in traditional PKC and ID-PKC are restricted since there are some flaws in them. In fact, in a ring signature based on PKC, the verifier must check the validity of certificates of some group members, which will make the signature scheme inefficient since the computational cost will increase with the group size. Moreover, the ring signature based on ID-PKC has the key escrow problem. As described before, certificateless cryptography can make up the drawbacks in traditional PKC and ID-PKC. Therefore, several certificateless ring signatures (CLRS) integrating ring signature with certificateless cryptography have been proposed [28] [29] [30] .
Over the last few decades, certificateless signature and ring signature have been studied extensively; however there is little work on certificateless ring signatures [28, [31] [32] [33] . Chow and Yap [32] presented a CLRS scheme based on a security model they proposed, but their scheme requires + 1 pairing operations and 2 exponentiation operations. Later, a CLRS scheme only requiring 5 pairing operations and 4 + 1 exponentiation operations was proposed by Zhang et al. (see [33] ). Two years later Chang et al. [31] constructed a concrete CLRS scheme, which reduces the pairing operations to 4 while it needs 4 + 2 exponentiation operations.
We know that it is always interesting to design a cryptographic scheme with less pairing operations to speed up the computation of pairing function in recent years. To the best of our knowledge, the most efficient certificateless ring signature scheme based on bilinear pairings requires at least four bilinear maps. In this paper, we will propose a certificateless ring signature. Our scheme only needs 3 bilinear maps in the verification phase. By the analysis in Section 6, we know that our scheme is more efficient compared with other certificateless ring signature schemes [31] [32] [33] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic concepts of bilinear pairings and some related mathematical problems. Section 3 presents a formal definition and security model of a certificateless ring signature scheme. Section 4 presents our certificateless ring signature scheme. We prove its security in Section 5. Schemes comparison will be given in Section 6. Finally, we give some conclusions in Section 7.
Preliminaries
2.1. Bilinear Pairing. Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group of prime order and G 2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order.
We call a bilinear pairing if :
is a map with the following three properties:
(1) Bilinearity: ( , ) = ( , ) , and , ∈ G 1 .
(2) Nondegeneracy: there exist , ∈ G 1 such that ( , ) ̸ = 1.
(3) Computability: there is an efficient algorithm to compute ( , ) for any two random elements , ∈ G 1 .
Security of the proposed scheme relies on the following questions and assumptions.
Definition 1 (computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem). Let G = ( , +), where is an elliptic curve over a finite field F and ∈ is a point having prime order = | |/2. Let G 1 = ⟨ ⟩ ≤ G, the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem is that given two random elements , ∈ G 1 for unknown , ∈ Z * , to compute .
Definition 2 (computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption). Let G be a CDH parameter generator. We say that an algorithm A has advantage ( ) in solving the CDH problem for G if, for a sufficiently large ,
Given an upper limitation time , we say that G satisfies the CDH assumption if for any randomized polynomial-time algorithm A, we have that Adv G,A ( ) is a negligible function. When G satisfies the CDH assumption, we say that the CDH problem is hard in G 1 generated by G.
Definition 3 (computational co-Diffie-Hellman (co-CDH) problem). Let G = ( , +), where is an elliptic curve over a finite field F and ∈ is a point having prime order = | |/2. Let G 1 = ⟨ ⟩ ≤ G; the Computational coDiffie-Hellman (co-CDH) Problem is that given two random elements , ∈ G 1 for unknown ∈ Z * , to compute .
Definition 4 (computational co-Diffie-Hellman (co-CDH) assumption). Let G be a co-CDH parameter generator. We say that an algorithm A has advantage ( ) in solving the co-CDH problem for G if, for a sufficiently large ,
Given an upper limitation time , we say that G satisfies the (co-CDH) assumption if for any randomized polynomialtime algorithm A, we have that Adv G,A ( ) is a negligible function. When G satisfies the (co-CDH) assumption, we say that the (co-CDH) problem is hard in G 1 generated by G. − 1 other users to form a ring U; then it outputs a ring signature on behalf of the ring U.
Formal Definition and Security Model
(vii) CLRS Verification. Given a message , a ring signature , and the public keys 1 , . . . , of the signers, it outputs "accept" if is a valid ring signature and "reject" otherwise.
Security Model of Certificateless Ring Signature Scheme.
In our certificateless ring signature scheme, we consider the following two attackers. (i) Setup. Given a security parameter, challenger C runs the setup algorithm to obtain a list of system parameters. And challenger C sends system parameters and the master key to type II adversary A II .
(ii) Hash Queries. A II submits any value he chooses, and challenger C returns the corresponding hash value to him.
(iii) User Public Key Queries. A II requests any public key of a user ID whom he chooses, and challenger C returns the corresponding public key to him. Game 3 Anonymity of a Certificateless Ring Signature Scheme. Let U = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) be signers and be the signers' identities. A be an adversary and C be a challenger whom are all involved in the game 3.
(i) The challenger C runs the setup algorithm to obtain a list of system parameters. And challenger C sends system parameters to adversary A.
(ii) The adversary A adaptively make a polynomially bounded number of queries.
(iii) In the challenge phase, the adversary outputs a message , a group of users' identities , and two different members ID 0 , ID 1 ∈ to the challenger C. The challenger C randomly chooses a bit ∈ {0, 1} and sends A to a ring signature = RS( , , ).
(iv) The adversary A can make a polynomially bounded number of queries.
(v) Finally, adversary A outputs a bit ∈ {0, 1}.
The adversary A wins the above game if and only if = .
Definition 7. Define the probability of success in the game 3 of adversary A as succ(A) = Pr[ = ] = 1/2 + . A certificateless ring signature scheme is said to have unconditional anonymity if no adversary has no nonnegligible advantage in winning the above game. That is to say, A certificateless ring signature scheme is said to have unconditional anonymity if = 0.
Our Scheme
In this section, we propose a certificateless ring signature scheme. Participants in the program include signers U = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) and a verifier . Our scheme is described as follows:
(i) Setup. Given a security parameter , KGC outputs a large prime . Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group of prime order . Let G 2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order. Let , be two generators of G 1 . KGC chooses the master private key ∈ Z * randomly and computes the master public key Pub = . Let : 
(2) Select , ∈ Z * and compute
then compute: 
If it holds, the verifier "accepts" the signature and "rejects" otherwise.
Security Analysis
In this section, we mainly focus on the unforgeability of the proposed certificateless ring signature scheme. Now, we give the following three theorems.
Unforgeability against Type I Adversary

Theorem 8. The scheme is unforgeable against a type I adversary A in the random oracle model if the CDH problem is hard.
Proof. Suppose challenger C receives a random instance ( , , ) of the CDH problem and has to compute the value of . Challenger C sets the system public key Pub = . C will run A I as a subroutine and act as A I 's challenger in game 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that all the queries are distinct. Now, we will show how challenger C answers a type I adversary A I 's queries in the following.
Initialization. At the beginning of the game, challenger C runs the setup algorithm with the parameter and then gives adversary A I the system parameters: (G 1 , G 2 , , , ] firstly. At the th 1 query, if ̸ = , challenger C randomly selects a value V ∈ Z * , and sets 1 (ID ) = V ; otherwise, challenger C sets 1 (ID * ) = .
(ii) 2 Queries. Challenger C maintains the list 2 of tuple ( , ℎ 2 ). The list is initially empty. When A I makes a query 2 ( ), challenger C selects a value ℎ 2 randomly, and sets 2 ( ) = ℎ 2 . Then challenger C adds ( , ℎ 2 ) to the 2 list and returns ℎ 2 to A I . (iii) 3 Queries. Challenger C maintains the list 3 of tuple ( , ℎ 3 ). The list is initially empty. When A I makes a query 3 ( ), challenger C selects a value ℎ 3 randomly and sets 3 ( ) = ℎ 3 . Then challenger C adds ( , ℎ 3 ) to the 3 list and returns ℎ 3 to A I . (viii) Ring Signature Queries. A I submits a message and a set of users' identities = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID }. C outputs a ring signature as follows. If there exists a user ID ∈ such that ID ̸ = ID * and ID ∉ , then challenger C returns the ring signature by calling the signing algorithm, where ID is the actual signer. Otherwise, challenger C does as follows:
(1) Selects , ∈ 1 randomly for all ∈ (1, 2, . . . , ) and ̸ = . (2) For all ∈ (1, 2, . . . , ), selects , ∈ Z * randomly. (3) Chooses two values , ∈ Z * randomly and computes
(4) Computes = Pub + . (5) Outputs = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , , 1 , 2 , . . . , , , ).
Forge. Adversary A I outputs a ring signature * on a message * that fulfills the following conditions:
* is a valid ring signature.
(2) A I cannot query the partial private key of anyone in U.
(3) The forged signature * is not from signature query.
Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Output. It follows from the forking lemma that if ≥ 7 2 /2 , adversary A I can give a valid forged signature within time in the above interaction; then we can construct another algorithm A I that outputs two signed messages within time 2 with probability at least 2 /66 2 . For the resemble construction, C can get two valid ring signature and satisfying = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , −1 , , +1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , , , ) ,   = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , −1 , , +1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , , , ) .
So we have
Challenger C outputs
Probability.
, , , and RS be times of 1 queries, 2 queries, 3 queries, partial private key queries, user public key queries, and ring signature queries, respectively. The probability that ID * 's partial private key was not queried by A I during the queries is (
. The probability that ID * belongs to the groups is /( 1 − ). The probability that ID * is the actual signer is 1/ . So the combined probability is (
Therefore, according to the forking lemma, if the attacker A I can succeed in making a valid ring signature with a probability , the advantage of challenger C solving an instance of CDH problem in game 1 is at least 2 /66
Unforgeability against Type II Adversary
Theorem 9. The scheme is unforgeable against a type II adversary A in the random oracle model if the co-CDH problem is hard.
Proof. Suppose challenger C receives a random instance ( , ) of the co-CDH and has to compute the value of . Challenger C sets = . Challenger C will run adversary A II as a subroutine and act as A II 's challenger in the game 2. Without loss of generality, we assume that all the queries are distinct. Now, we will show how challenger C answers type II adversary A II 's queries in the following.
Initialization. At the beginning of the game, challenger C runs the setup algorithm with the parameter and gives adversary A II the system parameters: (G 1 , G 2 , , , , Pub , , 1 , 2 , 3 ) and the system master secret key . Forge. Eventually, A II outputs a ring signature * fulfilling the following conditions:
(1)
(2) A II cannot query the secret value of anyone in U.
(3) A II cannot replace any users' public key in U.
(4) The forged signature * is not from signature query. 
Challenger outputs Table 3 : Comparison of the security of several certificateless ring signature schemes.
Schemes
Hard problems Models Scheme [32] -CAA problem and mICDH problem Random oracle model (ROM) Scheme [33] DL problem and CDH problem ROM Scheme [31] DL problem and CDH problem ROM Our scheme CDH problem and co-CDH problem ROM
, , , , and RS be the times of 1 queries, 2 queries, 3 queries, secret value queries, user public key replacement requests, user public key queries, and ring signature queries, respectively.
For simplification, we may assume that ∩ = . The probability that ID * 's secret value was not queried and ID * 's public key was not replaced by A II during the queries is ( − − )/ . The probability that ID * belongs to the groups is /( − − ). The probability that ID * is the actual signer is 1/ . So the combined probability is:
Therefore, according to the forking lemma, if the attacker A II can succeed in making a valid ring signature with a probability , the advantage of challenger C solving an instance of co-CDH problem in the game 2 is at least 2 /66 3 ⋅ 1/ .
Unconditional Anonymity
Theorem 10. Our certificateless ring signature scheme has the property of unconditional anonymity. For any algorithm A, any set of signers U = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) and a random ∈ U, the probability [ = ] = 1/2, where = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , , 1 , 2 , . . . , , , ) is a ring signature on U generated by .
Proof. (i) The challenger C runs the setup algorithm to obtain a list of system parameters. And challenger C sends system parameters to adversary A.
(ii) The adversary A adaptively makes a polynomially bounded number of queries.
(iii) The adversary A outputs a message , two different members ID 1 , ID 2 ∈ to the challenger C. The challenger C randomly chooses a bit ∈ {0, 1} and sends A to a ring signature = RS( , , ).
In our scheme, since , are chosen randomly from G 1 , , are also random elements from Z * . Moreover, , are chosen randomly from Z * , so is also a random element from G 1 . For anyone of a set of signers U, message , the distribution of = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , , 1 , 2 , . . . , , , ) is independently and uniformly distributed no matter who the actual signer is. The fact illustrates that anyone has no advantage to know who signs the certificateless ring signature. Hence, Pr[ = ] = 1/2; the anonymity holds.
Comparison
Comparison of the Efficiency.
We will compare the performance of our scheme with several certificateless ring signature schemes; see Table 2 . The running times are listed in Table 1 . We define some notations as follows: 
Comparison of the Security.
We will give the comparison of the security of our scheme and several previous certificateless ring signature schemes [31] [32] [33] from the hard problems that these schemes rely on and the models these schemes depend on; see Table 3 .
Conclusion
There are some certificateless ring signature schemes based on bilinear pairings, which have been proposed over last years. But the computation cost of the pairings is very high. Therefore it is always interesting to design a cryptographic scheme with less pairing operations to speed up the computation of pairing function. In this paper, we propose an efficient certificateless ring signature scheme with only three bilinear parings. We also prove the unforgeability of our signature scheme against type I and type II adversaries in the random oracle based on the hardness of Computational Diffe-Hellman problem and co-Computational DiffeHellman problem. From Table 2 , we can see that our scheme is more efficient than the previous related schemes. Due to the good properties of our scheme, it is very useful for practical applications.
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